Interpersonal transfers: Do they impact the growth of poor and rich European regions? by Olivier Meunier et al.
© Investigaciones Regionales. 10 – Páginas 155 a 170
Sección ARTÍCULOS
Interpersonal transfers: Do they impact the growth of
poor and rich European regions?
Olivier Meunier, Michel Mignolet y Marie-Eve Mulquin*
ABSTRACT: The purpose of this paper is to investigate how national interpersonal
transfer policies affect regions’economic growth. Reviewing the economic literature,
we found only incidental evidences and contradictory conclusions. Our objective is
to provide some statistical evidence of the relation between interregional interperso-
nal redistribution towards poor European regions and their relative growth. Using
some recent developments in the field of spatial data analysis, we found that interper-
sonal transfers do not seem to affect negatively the economic growth of poor Euro-
pean regions, while it is not possible to assert their impact on rich regions.
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Transferencias interpersonales: ¿Impactan en el crecimiento de las regiones
pobres y ricas de Europa?
RESUMEN: El propósito de este artículo es investigar cómo las políticas de transfe-
rencias interpersonales a nivel nacional afectan el desarrollo económico de las regiones.
Tras una revisión de la literatura económica, encontramos solamente evidencias fortui-
tas y conclusiones contradictorias. Nuestro objetivo es proporcionar evidencia estadís-
tica acerca de la relación entre la redistribución interpersonal interregional hacia regio-
nes europeas pobres y su crecimiento relativo. Usando algunos desarrollos recientes en
el campo del análisis de datos espaciales, encontramos que las transferencias interper-
sonales no parecen afectar negativamente el desarrollo económico de regiones europeas
pobres, mientras que no es posible afirmar su impacto en regiones ricas.
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1. Introducción
In modern countries, interpersonal redistribution is widely implemented. The tax sys-
tem organizes a redistribution of resources between households, lowering disparities
of disposable income. This interpersonal redistribution gives rise to an important in-
terregional redistribution: net transfers flow to or from regions, typically increasing
the purchasing power in lagging regions while reducing that of more prosperous re-
gions. 
To what extent rich regions should share their affluence with less fortunate ones
is a subject of political contention in many developed countries. Large or growing in-
terregional income disparities tend indeed to generate political tensions. In a context
of sluggish growth and intense international competition, rich regions belonging to
federal states like Belgium, Germany or Canada complain that excessive transfers
curb regional government efforts to strengthen the economic development. In Bel-
gium, for instance, where interregional disparities are not only economic but also cul-
tural (and linguistic), claims from the Northern Flemish region for a split of the
country often ground on such considerations. In this view, substantive transfers not
only hinder economic performances of the rich but also tend to slow the catching up
of poor regions.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate if national interpersonal transfer poli-
cies affect regions’economic growth. Our objective is to provide some statistical evi-
dence of the relation (if any) between interregional interpersonal redistribution to-
wards poor European regions and their relative growth. Ideally, we should not have
limited the study to the interpersonal transfers and rather considered the whole finan-
cial flows between regions. However, the highly complex interplay of regional poli-
cies, interpersonal and institutional solidarity, intergovernmental financial grants and
other fiscal equalization mechanisms makes the homogenized computation of actual
amount of interregional transfers hardly possible on an international basis1. Hence,
our approach is partial but should nevertheless shed some light on an increasingly de-
bated topic: is a transfer policy able to achieve equity and growth simultaneously?
The layout of this paper is as followed. Section 2 gives a brief outline of the main
results of the economic literature. We shall see that the literature provides only inci-
dental evidences and contradictory conclusions. Section 3 and Section 4 are then de-
voted to the empirical analysis. We found that interpersonal transfers do not seem to
affect negatively the economic growth of poor European regions, while it is not pos-
sible to assert their impact on rich regions.
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review of the literature
The relationship between income redistribution and economic growth is the subject
of a large literature. Implicitly or explicitly, many of the discussions refer to the
trade-off between the goals of growth and (interpersonal) equity, made popular by
Okun (1975). In this view, income inequality is said «to reflect a system of rewards
and penalties that is designed to encourage effort». On the contrary, taxes and trans-
fers reduce incentives to work, savings and investments, resulting in market rigidi-
ties, forgone work effort in the present and reduced investment and growth in the fu-
ture. 
The trade-off argument, long a prominent feature of most economics textbooks, is
now widely contested. In particular, one major theme of the endogenous growth the-
ory is precisely that such a trade-off does not exist. Within this framework, the gene-
ral presumption is a positive association between equality and growth. This results
from emphasis put in new growth models on the importance of human capital, of in-
tergenerational transmission of both human and physical capital and of externalities
in production. Reviewing the vast literature on inequality and growth, Aghio, Caroli
and García-Peñalosa (1999, p. 1656), conclude «that when capital markets are imper-
fect, there is a scope for redistributive policies which are also growth-enhancing»2.
Although numerous studies have investigated the connexion between income re-
distribution and economic growth, to our knowledge, relatively few have dealt with
underlying regional implications. Of course, the impact of interregional transfers on
regional growth has long and extensively been scrutinized in spatial economics. Ho-
wever, the bulk of this literature focuses on interregional transfers in the form of pu-
blic investment or the providing of productive public services: education, Research
and Development (R&D) financing, infrastructure, in particular transportation facili-
ties, etc. The reason is probably that regional redistribution based on personal trans-
fers does usually not belong to the framework of analysis of regional policy. Moreo-
ver, as Dupont and Martin (2006, p. 3) point out, reducing regional disparities does
not necessarily lead to a reducing of inequalities among individuals. This in turn rai-
ses interesting questions on the relation between spatial disparities and individual
inequalities. Let’s note that the purpose of our contribution, i.e. assessing the impact
of interpersonal redistribution on regional economic growth, actually amounts to dis-
cuss this relation, but maybe in a somewhat unusual and admittedly partial fashion. 
Due to its financial importance, the European so-called cohesion policy has yield
an important body of researches aimed at assessing its impact on the European Union
(EU) regions’growth and convergence. However, Ederveen et al. (2002) note that the
large number of case studies, model simulations and some (though surprisingly few)
econometric studies offer no consensus about the cohesion policy on convergence.
«Researches draw different conclusions from different studies, ranging from a dismal
impact on economic growth of lagging regions to widely positive assessments of pro-
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(p. 48).
Interregional transfers that take place to diverse extent within most European
countries have also spurred some empirical works investigating their efficiency and
equitableness. One may cite among others De la Fuente and Vives (1995), Garcia-
Milà and McGuire (2001) or De la Fuente (2002), who evaluate the effectiveness of
interregional transfers (and EU grants) in Spain, Ferreira Dias and Silva (2004) who
assess the impact of interregional transfers on the convergence of Portuguese regions
or Decressin (1999) and Auteri and Constantini (2003), who analyse the transfers to
the Italian Southern regions. However, this literature as well as other similar resear-
ches hardly depict a consistent picture. A quite general outcome is that interregional
transfer policies do not come up with the high expectations they have raised (Eder-
veen et al., 2002). Reasons are possibly double: either because transfers would be po-
orly effective at improving the overall economic performance of lagging regions or
even because they would actually cause aggregate welfare losses (De la Fuente,
1995). Another line of empirical research dealt with income convergence in the line
of the Barro and Sala-I-Martin’s seminal work3. A recurrent result of these estima-
tions is that the speeds at which regions of different countries converge over time pe-
riods are «surprisingly» similar (Sala-I-Martin, 1996, p. 1342). Hence, if the speed of
regional convergence is similar for countries characterized by widely different regio-
nal cohesion policy, the effects of such a regional policy could hardly be very subs-
tantive.
Interregional transfers have also been subject to a substantial amount of theoreti-
cal work. One contribution is the design of optimal transfers instruments , another
one is the analysis of the complex interplay of conflicting agents’ behaviours and its
impact on the regional economy. The New Economic Geography (NEG) proved to be
in this respect a particularly valuable approach. The contribution of the NEG in as-
sessing the mixed results of the financing of regional transportation infrastructure of-
fers a good illustration. Another example is the NEG highlighted equity and effi-
ciency trade-off at the regional level. Because some economic agents are not (or not
very) mobile, an equity motivation asks for a more uniform distribution of economic
activities across regions. Conversely, from an efficiency perspective, positive agglo-
meration gains, mainly due to economies of scale, plead for a greater concentration.
A cohesion policy intended to achieve a more balanced economic development
across regions can therefore be achieved only at the expense of the aggregate growth.
On the other hand, due to the cumulative, non-linear nature of the agglomeration pro-
cess, it is difficult to anticipate (and evaluate) the effects of such cohesion policies
(Puga, 2002 and Baldwin et al., 2002).
Some authors have nevertheless attempted to assess the effects of non-capital
transfers, but the results also offered disparate and mixed, even conflicting evidences.
Desmet (2002), for instance, argues that transfers linked to unemployment benefits or
public employment contribute to the long-run persistence of uneven regional deve-
lopment, essentially by raising the real wages in poor regions without a correspon-
158 Meunier, O., Mignolet, M. y Mulquin, M. E.
3 Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1991, 1992 and 1995). See De la Fuente (1997) for a selective review.
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apply to capital subsidies, which increase the likelihood of a lagging region taking
off4. Martin (1998 and 1999) notes that a financial transfer should succeed in lowe-
ring regional income inequalities, but at the expense of the aggregate growth rate. In
his view, the transfer policy induces some firms to relocate to the beneficiary region.
This lower induced concentration results in turn in less local spillovers and higher
transaction costs. Conversely, Futamura (1998), whose study may easily be reinter-
preted in regional terms, suggests that current transfers do not necessarily hinder effi-
ciency while capital transfers do. This surprising conclusion results from the follo-
wing: as the transfer depends on the capital stock differential between the poor and
the rich regions, both regions have an incentive to reduce their capital stock in order
to increase or lower the amount of transfer respectively received or granted. 
At the end of this short review, it becomes apparent that our topic has still to be
settled. On a regional scale, the impact of the interpersonal solidarity induced income
transfers on the regional economic growth has been relatively little-studied and re-
mains a much debated issue. Both theoretical and empirical researches offered mixed
or incidental results.
In the following sections, we intend to make a modest contribution to this debate
by trying to estimate the impact of interpersonal transfers on the economic growth of
European regions.
3. A first specification of the model
The question we try to answer is simple. Does the tax-transfer system help conver-
gence between poor regions and rich regions or does it slow the «catching-up» of lag-
ging regions? Or, to put it straightforward, does granting or receiving transfers have
an impact on regional economic growth rates? 
If the question looks simple, the answer is not. It is evident that fast growing re-
gions are mainly contributors to transfers and slowly growing mainly beneficiaries
from transfers. A simple correlation will then indicate that for contributors higher
paid transfers are related to a higher growth while for beneficiaries higher received
transfers are related to a lower growth. This observation is naïve. A right answer
should take into account all factors affecting growth to see if «all those factors being
taken constant» higher transfers impact growth. To answer this question, we begin to
test a simple ad hoc model, whose formulation takes the following form:
gr = α + β1y0,r + β2gc + β3RELr + β4T1r + β5T2r + εr [1]
where gr = (ln YT,r – ln Y0,r)/T is the annual regional growth rate for region r (r =
1,…,R), with Y0,r indicating the per capita gross domestic product (GDP), α and β are
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properties.
The determinants of economic growth have been proved to be numerous, varying
across searchers and across papers. Among this vast array of results, the initial level
of income systematically seems to matter in nearly all regressions run in the literature
(Sala-I-Martin, 1996). Routinely introduced to test the concept of conditional conver-
gence first defined by Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1992), the initial level of income is
usually found to have a significant negative impact on growth5. The initial level is de-
noted y0,r with y0,r = lnY0,r.
Regional growth dynamics can not be considered independently from neighbou-
ring economic performances. Spatial economics has amply demonstrated the impor-
tance of geographic location on regional growth. To attempt to take account of it in a
very simple way, we introduce in the regression the growth rate gc of the country to
which the region belongs. It is expected to somehow capture any regional spill-over
effects occurring within a country. We do not know a priori the sign of the coefficient
associated with gc, as the theory predicts positive effects as well as depressing effects,
depending on factors such as transport cost or production factors mobility6.
The growth rate of a region depends on numerous structural elements that in-
fluence its performance in a constant way relatively to the national one. To try to cap-
ture all those elements, we introduce the variable RELr, an indicator of the relative
wealth of the region with respect to the nation7. It is expected that regardless of the
importance of the transfers received, a relatively poorer region in a richer country
will enjoy a lower growth due to the permanence of structural elements that impede
its economic development.
Finally, T1r and T2r are the variables whose coefficients interest us. T1r (T2r) is
equal to the interpersonal transfer indicator if a region r is a beneficiary of (contribu-
tor to) interregional transfers and zero if not.
Assessing the impact of interregional income transfers on regional economic
growth comes up against a major difficulty, namely the assessments of the flows
themselves. As Wishlade et al. (1999) point out, the difficulty of measuring interre-
gional transfers induced by the complex interplay of national taxes, public spending
and social security expenditures are both conceptual and statistical. At the conceptual
level, it is often unclear how a particular tax or a particular expenditure should be re-
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5 Two others variables that are also widely used in the growth literature are the average investment rate
and an indicator of the level of human capital (for instance, primary or secondary enrolment rate). Howe-
ver, the lack of an extensive homogeneous dataset prevents us from testing such variables.
6 The national average is computed as followed: gc = ∑gr (pr/pc) where gc is the GDP per capita growth
rate in country c (to which the region r belongs) and pi (i = r,c) is the population in region r and in country
c, respectively. 
7 This indicator is computed as the ratio of the regional against national primary income per capita:
RELr =
where primi (i = r, c) denotes as above the primary income of region r and country c, respectively and pi
(i = r, c) is the population in region r and in country c, respectively.
primr/pr
primc/pc
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diture can be split between regions in theory, there may well be statistical difficulties
in practice (p. 116). Accordingly, relatively few studies have been undertaken to as-
sess the extent of interregional income transfers and among those, even less have
tried to realize the exercise at a multinational level. National specific solidarity me-
chanisms and regional redistribution practices make it difficult to arrive at a common
definition of interregional flows. According to Begg (2003, p. 55), there is even little
to be gained by trying to shoehorn data constructed on such varying bases into a sin-
gle empirical measure.
In this contribution, we chose to restrict our definition of interregional transfers to
those arising from the sole interpersonal solidarity mechanisms. More precisely, we
derived an index grounded on the comparison of regional household primary and dis-
posable incomes. The intuition is simple. Personal tax transfer-system results in subs-
tantial flows to or from regions, typically increasing the disposable income of weaker
regions, while reducing that of more prosperous regions. Our transfer index, called
trsfr, is computed as followed:
trsfr = 
where dispoi and primi [i = r, c] are respectively the primary and disposable incomes
measured in region r and in country c. Atrsfr index superior to one reveals that the re-
gion r is a net beneficiary of interregional transfers within the country c. An index in-
ferior to one indicates that the region is a net contributor. Accordingly, we introduce
in (1) two variables for the transfers, T1r equals to trsfr for beneficiary regions (i.e. re-
gions displaying trsfr values superior to one) and 0 for contributing, and T2r equals to
1/trsfr for contributing regions (i.e. regions displaying a transfer index inferior to one)
and 0 for beneficiary regions. Hence, we will try to unravel the impact of transfers on
the economic growth of beneficiary regions from the effect on the performance of
contributing regions. Note that by construction the higher the transfers, the higher are
the transfer indicators.
This measure is obviously partial, as it does not take into account transfers indu-
ced by public spending, health care reimbursements or explicit transfers between
sub-national governments8. Nevertheless, our index provides an indication of the le-
vel of interregional transfers, through interpersonal solidarity, which accounts for a
big stake of interregional transfers. One can hardly imagine a region benefiting from
a high level of personal solidarity that turns out to be actually a net regional transfers
contributor. Moreover, the index has the crucial advantage to be based on standardi-
zed income statistics immediately available. 
Our approach clearly suffers from a limitation. Coefficients of T1 and T2 will
probably be affected by a simultaneity bias as higher transfers are associated with
dispor/dispoc
primr/primc
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gions to support poorer ones («horizontal» transfers) and the interplay of national taxation and social
charges, social protection payments («vertical» transfers).
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results will have to be interpreted with caution.
4. Data
The data are extracted from the EUROSTAT-REGIO database (see Annex). EUROS-
TAT is the Statistical Office for the European Communities.
Measures for the regional GDP (in Purchasing Power Parity, PPP) per capita,
regional population and regional primary and disposable incomes come from the
EUROSTAT-REGIO database, which is widely used in empirical studies on Euro-
pean regions. Our sample included 230 NUTS-2 regions in 15 European countries
over the period 1995-20029: Austria (9 regions), Belgium (11 reg.), Czech Republic
(8 reg.), France (22 reg.), Germany (41 reg.), Greece (13 reg.), Hungary (7 reg.),
Ireland (2 reg.), Italy (19 reg.), Netherlands (12 reg.), Poland (16 reg.), Portugal
(5 reg.), Slovakia (3 reg.), Spain (16 reg.), Sweden (8 reg.) and United Kingdom
(37 reg.).
It is worth noticing that the PPP measure means implicitly that the computed
growth rates are not the usual GDPgrowth but a measure of the regional performance
relative to the average European growth10.
The choice of the NUTS-2 as our level of regional breakdown is dictated by data
availability. Ideally, this choice should have been based on theoretical considerations,
as the spatial scale of observations may affect the inference results. In the literature,
this problem is referred to the modifiable areal unit problem (or MAUP) (Openshaw
and Taylor, 1979)11. Accordingly, due to possible MAUP effects, we shall interpret
our statistical results with caution.
5. OLS estimations results
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation results applied to the specification (1) are shown
in Table 1.
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9 The choice of the observation period is simply dictated by data availability and our will to use a
sample as large and homogenous as possible. Periods lasting from 1995 to 2000, 2001 or 2002 are
commonly used in the literature so that we do not expect any significant impact of this choice on the
results.
10 One consequence of this is that our estimated coefficient should not be compared with similar coeffi-
cients in the literature, on convergence for instance.
11 As an example of the MAUP issue, Dall’erba (2005) notes that the area of Castile-Leon (in Spain) is
585 times greater than the one of Brussels (Belgium), but that both are official NUTS-2 regions. Accor-
dingly, when «the spatial units scale of observation for the data do not match up the scale and extent of
the studied process, it may result in a statistical problem wherein spatially correlated and/or heteroskedas-
tic error structures occur» (p. 126). Another problem arises from measuring a variable on a territorial unit
that is artificially defined (p. 126).
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cally insignificant at the conventional level of significance. The coefficients of both
gc and RELr are found to be positive and significant. Economic growth of a region is
thus all the more important as the region belongs to a growing national economy. It is
also positively correlated with the relative regional wealth: a region whose primary
income is higher than the national average tends to grow faster than a region displa-
ying relatively lower income performance.
Transfers, both received and granted, have a positive impact on growth. The in-
terpretation of the sign of the coefficients of the transfer indexes asks however for
caution. We mentioned previously the likely presence of a simultaneity bias. This one
should be negative for slow growing regions as they are potentially major beneficia-
ries from transfers and positive for fast growing regions as they are major contri-
butors. 
Taking this possible bias into account, the results shown in Table 1 suggest that
transfers received have a positive impact on lagging regions’growth while the partial
positive correlation between transfers granted and growth (for rich regions) stems
from the simultaneity bias. 
Until now, countries and regions are actually treated as independent economies,
which is highly unlikely. In reality, regions do interact with each other and not only
with their national regions. Spatial interactions due to geographical spillovers need
then to be better taken into account in a more sophisticated way that the one adopted
in the simple OLS model.
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12 Spatial autocorrelation has two different sources (Debarsy and Ertur, 2006). It can be detected when
the observations obey to an underlying spatial process that links spatial units by an exact function which
captures interaction effects among studied localizations. Spatial dependence can also result from a miss-
pecification of the model, such as measurement error, incorrect functional form, or the omission of some
spatially correlated variables.
Table 1. OLS estimates for specification (1) 
Variables estimates t-stat p > | t |
(Intercept) –4.852 –2.274 0.006
GDP level in 1995 –0.337 –1.626 0.105
Transfers received 4.408 3.164 0.002
Transfers granted 4.575 3.273 0.001
National growth rate 0.876 13.639 0.000
Relative level of primary income 1.654 3.166 0.000
Number of observations = 230
F(5,224) = 82.82
Prob > F = 0.000
R2 = 0.657
AIC = 549.014
SC = 569.642
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Following Anselin (1988), spatial interactions refer to both spatial dependence and
spatial heterogeneity. This author defined spatial autocorrelation as the coincidence
of value similarity with locational similarity12. In other words, spatial dependence oc-
curs when the observations at one location partly depend on the values of observa-
tions at neighbouring locations, the neighbourhood being defined by a spatial weight
matrix. Spatial heterogeneity means in turn that economic behaviours are not stable
over space. Spatial heterogeneity can be reflected either by varying coefficients, i.e.
structural instability, or by varying error variances across observations, i.e. heteroske-
dasticity (Beaumont et al., 2003).
In this contribution, we shall only deal with the spatial autocorrelation issue.
The spatial weight matrix is the fundamental tool used to model spatial intercon-
nectedness of the areas in the sample13. It exogenously defines the way regions are
spatially connected. By convention, the elements wii on the diagonal are set to zero
whereas the elements wij indicate the strength of the connection between the pair of
regions i and j. Generally, it is expected that neighbouring areas would have a stron-
ger interaction compared to geographically distant areas.
The specification of the spatial weighted matrix is a major point of contention in
the literature, because the choice of the weights can have a substantive impact on the
results (Abreu et al., 2004)14. There is however little formal guidance in the choice of
the correct spatial weights in any given application (Anselin, 2002). One important
consideration is nevertheless that, for identification reasons, the spatial weight matrix
must be exogenous to the model15. Accordingly, in this paper, we chose to borrow the
accessibility weight matrix from Debarsy and Ertur (2006), wherein the connection
between two regions is defined by the time needed, using roads, to join the two regio-
nal capitals (which serve as reference points for regions)16. Formally, the Debarsy
and Ertur (2006)’s spatial weight matrix is defined as follows:
w* ij = (dij)–η ; ∀i ≠ j {w* ij = 0
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13 The specification of a spatial weight matrix is necessary because the variance-covariance matrix (in
the presence of spatial autocorrelation) contains too many parameters to be estimated using cross-sectio-
nal data. Abreu et al. (2004).
14 Arange of suggestion have been offered in the literature. See Cliff and Ord (1973), Anselin (1988 and
2002), Anselin and Bera (1998).
15 Actually, if the matrix contains any of the variables included in the empirical model, this one becomes
highly non-linear. This pitfall explains why most spatial weight matrix are based on contiguity or dis-
tance, since these are geographic-based measures that are unambiguously exogenous (Abreu et al., 2004).
However, it could be interesting to investigate further the use of other non-binary spatial weights, that ac-
counts for the socio-economic weights of the neighbours.
16 Debarsy and Ertur (2006) used the ViaMichelin© website to compute distances between all pair of re-
gions. The authors assumed that the  time-distance separating two regions is identical, no matter the se-
lected direction chosen. The ViaMichelin© recommended route is a mixed between the shortest and the
quickest routes that takes deviations, road works, speed limits among others into account. The computa-
tion has been done in November 2004. Debarssy and Ertur (2006), p. 6.
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meter fixed a priori and set to 1. Finally, the weight matrix is row standardized so that
it is the relative and not the absolute distance that matters (Beaumont et al., 2003).17
Having a spatial weight matrix at our disposal, we can now turn to the modeling
of spatial dependence. Two kinds of econometric specification are typically used to
deal with spatial autocorrelation issue (Anselin, 1988, 2001): the endogenous spatial
lag (or spatial autoregressive model, SAR) and the spatially autocorrelated errors
(SEM). The former, the SAR model, incorporates a spatial lag variable, namely Wg,
in the set of explanatory variables. Formally, the specification [1] becomes:
g = αS + ρWg + β1y0 + β2REL + β3T1 + β4T2 + ε ε [2]
ε ε~N(0, σ2I)
where S is a unit vector, ρ is the autoregressive parameter that indicates the intensity
of spatial interaction between regions, W is the spatial weight matrix, g is the vector
of the regional GDP growth rate between 1995 and 2002, y0 is the vector of the initial
level of regional GDP per capita (in logarithm), REL measures the relative wealth of
a region within its country and T1 and T2 stand for the level of transfer received and
granted, respectively18.
Alternatively, spatial autocorrelation can be introduced by means of the error
term. The so-called SEM specification transforms our initial model as follows:
g = αS +  β1y0 + β2REL + β3T1 + β4T2 + ε ε [3]
ε ε = λWε ε + uu ~ N(0, σ2I)
where λ expresses the level of spatial autocorrelation between error terms of neigh-
bouring regions.
According to Anselin (2002), if spatial lag model (SAR) can be referred to as de-
aling with substantive spatial correlation, the correlation in the error models (SEM) is
usually more referred to as a nuisance19.
7. Estimation results
Statistical inference based on Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) when spatial depen-
dence is present is not reliable20. Anselin (2002) notes that these models require spe-
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a spatial lag operation (pre-multiplying a vector of observations by the matrix W) corresponds to an ave-
raging of the neighbouring values.
18 Note that we dropped the variable gc which became somehow redundant with the spatial lag variable.
19 Indeed, as Florax and Nijkamp (2003, p. 14) point out, in the spatial error model, spatial dependence is
caused either by (erroneously) omitted spatially correlated variables or is caused by boundaries of regions
that do not coincide with actual behavioural unit.
20 Estimation of SAR model by OLS yields biased and inconsistent estimators, because the spatially lag-
ged variable is correlated with the error term. Estimation of the SEM model by OLS produces inefficient
estimators due to non-spherical errors. Le Gallo (2002), pp. 146-147.
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or generalized method of moments21. In this study, maximum likelihood techniques
implemented through the Matlab Spatial Statistical Toolbox developed by J. Lesage
have been used22. Results of the estimation by Maximum Likelihood are displayed in
Table 2.
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21 Maximum likelihood technique can be applied to estimate both SAR and SEM specifications. Instru-
mental variables provide an alternative method to estimate spatial lag models whereas the generalized
method of moments may be used to estimate spatial error model. See Le Gallo and Dall’erba (2005).
22 http://www.spatial.econometrics.com
23 Lagrange multiplier (LM) error and lag tests may be affected by the presence of alternative form of
spatial dependence. Hence the development of their robust versions. Trendle (2004), p.10.
24 The Lagrange Multiplier tests are applied to the residuals of the OLS estimation of the model (1). (see
Table 1).
Variables
Spatial lag model Spatial error model
Estimates t-stat p >  | t | estimates t-stat p > | t |
(Intercept) 0.720 0.429 0.668 3.187 1.485 0.138
GDP level in 1995 –1.707 –8.991 0.000 –2.021 –9.126 0.000
Transfers received 3.909 3.010 0.002 4.006 3.163 0.002
Transfers granted 4.112 3.231 0.001 4.198 3.283 0.001
Relative level of primary income 2.980 5.381 0.000 3.319 5.878 0.000
RHO 0.964 39.057 0.000 n.a. n.a. n.a.
LAMBDA n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.953 30.440 0.000
Log likelihood –247.026 –246.199
Sigma2 0.983 0.437
AIC 504.052 502.398
SC 521.242 519.588
Table 2. Spatial autoregressive and error model estimates
Table 2 shows that the spatial parameters in both the SAR and the SEM specifica-
tion, respectively ρ and λ, are highly positive and significant, meaning that the inten-
sity of spatial interactions is quite high. 
Which specification does match best our purpose? Following the usual approach
adopted in the literature, we first estimated a version of the model (1), from which the
variable gc has been removed, using Ordinary Least Squares. Then, the next step in
modelling involved determining whether spatial autocorrelation was present in the
residuals of the regression, and if so, whether it is best represented by a spatial lag
(SAR) or spatial error (SEM) model.
Commonly used in the literature, the Moran’s I test, adapted to regression resi-
duals by Cliff and Ord (1981), is used to check the presence of global spatial depen-
dence. Secondly, we performed the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests to identify the na-
ture of the spatial dependence: respectively LMLAG and LMERR and their robust
versions23. The results of these tests are shown in Table 324.
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rrelation, but provide no indication concerning the nature of the spatial dependence.
Results of both LM error and lag tests are highly significant. The robust form of LM
error test also returned significant results, but the robust ML lag test is not significant.
This diagnosis tends to indicate the presence of spatial error autocorrelation rather
than a spatial lag variable25. Finally, the Likelihood Ratio (LR) common factor test le-
ads us to reject the more general spatial Durbin model.
The spatial error model (SEM) thus proves to be the appropriate specification for
our dataset, what is generally confirmed by the empirical literature studying spatial
dependence between European regions26. As regards the SEM results shown in Table
2, the estimation of a spatial specification leaves our conclusions unchanged. If the
values of the estimated coefficients necessarily differ from previous OLS estimates,
their sign, significance and therefore interpretation remain similar. In particular, the
results suggest that interregional transfers received (T1) tend to improve the econo-
mic performance of slow growing regions. Conversely, we found no evidence that
granting transfers (T2) hinders the economic growth of contributing regions. Note
that the initial level of income is now statistically significant.
8. Conclusion
Is a transfer policy able to achieve equity and growth simultaneously? This paper in-
tended to shed some light on this increasingly debated question by investigating if
and how national transfer policies affect European regions’economic growth. We fo-
cused in particular on interpersonal solidarity induced transfers between regions. Our
approach is modest and partial. Nevertheless it has the advantage to rest on standardi-
zed statistics.
Using some recent developments in the field of spatial data analysis, we found
some evidences that interregional interpersonal transfers have a positive impact on
the economic growth of poor regions. Conversely, it has not been possible to assert
their impact on rich contributing regions. 
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25 We follow the decision rule suggested by Anselin and Florax (1995). See Beaumont et al. (2003).
26 See for instance Le Gallo and Dall’erba (2005) or Beaument et al. (2003). Interestingly, Debarsy and
Ertur (2006) find that spatial dependence between enlarged European Union regions in best represented
by a spatial lag model (SAR).
Table 3. Tests for residual spatial autocorrelation
Test test value p-value
Moran’s I 21530 0.000
LM error 164.593 0.000
LM lag 102.618 0.000
Robust LM error 63.281 0.000
Robust LM lag 1.306 0.253
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transfers, that are missing in our modelling. This important limitation is due to the
shortage of reliable international data at a NUTS-2 spatial break-down and this issue
should deserve further attention. Note however that the variable we introduced to
capture the effect of structural elements that affect the performance of a region rela-
tive to its nation has been found constantly positive and significant. In relatively poor
countries, rich regions tend to achieve better economic performances than poor re-
gions and vice-versa.
Further investigations should be aimed to deal with possible spatial heterogeneity
issue in our dataset as well as the computation of more detailed and comprehensive
transfer statistics.
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Data for GDP per inhabitant are expressed in index in relation to the European Union (EU-25) ave-
rage set to equal 100. If the index of a region is higher than 100, this region’s level of GDP per inhabitant
is higher than the EU average and vice versa. The volume index of GDP per capita is then measured in
Purchasing Power Standards (PPS). For the calculation of regional GDP at level NUTS-2 the same pur-
chasing power parity is used for all regions of one country.
Demographic data are computed on an annual average basis.
Data for primary income and disposable income come from regional household accounts (ESA-95).
Both are expressed in millions of Euros (from 1.1.1999) and in millions of ECU (up to 31.12.1998).
Data for GDP per capita (PPS) and population are available for the whole period 1995-2002 for all
the 230 regions of our sample. Primary and disposable income data are available for the whole period
1995-2002, for all sample regions, except for Austria (1995-2000): Hungary (1995-1999): Poland (1998-
2001), Portugal (2000-2002) and the Netherlands (1995-2001).
We use the EUROSTAT 1995 nomenclature of statistical territorial units, which referred to as NUTS
(Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics). In this nomenclature, NUTS-2 means Basic Adminis-
trative Units. Our sample included 230 NUTS-2 regions in 15 European countries: 
• Austria: 9 regions.
• Belgium: 11 regions.
• Czech Republic: 8 regions.
• France: 22 regions. Guadeloupe, Martinique, Guyana and Reunion are excluded because of their
geographical distance.
• Germany: 41 regions.
• Greece: 13 regions. 
• Hungary: 7 regions. 
• Ireland: 2 regions.
• Italy: 19 regions. Autonomous provinces of Bolzano and Trento are excluded.
• Netherlands: 12 regions.
• Poland: 16 regions. 
• Portugal: 5 regions. The Azores and Madeira are excluded because of their geographical distance.
• Slovakia: 3 regions. 
• Spain: 16 regions. Canary Islands, Ceuta and Mellila are excluded. 
• Sweden: 8 regions.
• United Kingdom: 37 regions.
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